Dominant models of the processes of causal attribution have hitherto appealed to the covariational criterion of causal ascription. However systematic deviations from the normative predictions made by these models indicate that subjects may be employing different criteria in causal attribution. An alternative model grounded in recent ordinary language philosophy is proposed which postulates that subjects employ counterfactual and contrastive criteria of causal ascription, as unified in the notion of an abnormal condition. This model proposes that the function of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information is to furnish contrast cases against which to evaluate the target event, and that their effect on causal attribution is mediated by their perceived informativeness about the entities involved. Experiment I demonstrates that world knowledge affects the perceived informativeness of the consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information about the target entities. Experiment 2 demonstrates that these effects on perceived informativeness caused by world knowledge predict variations in causal attribution proper. Together these studies validate the claims of recent ordinary langauge philosophy that the concepts of logical presupposition and focus as expressed in the notion of an abnormal condition solve some of the problems found in the application of the covariation principle to commonsense explanation.
the ANOVA model in assuming that causal attribution involves internal/external partitioning of factors and observation of the covariation between these factors and the occurrence of the target event (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976; Kelley, 1967 Kelley, , 1972 Kelley, , 1973 Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Weiner, 1982) . All of these models take for granted that the commonsense notion of causality appears to be the covariational criterion. Yet it was not until very recently that a full process model specifying a set of effective procedures with associated representation and process assumptions (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1983 ) for making causal attributions has been spelled out (Jaspars, 1983; Jaspars, Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983) . The natural logic model proposed by Jaspars carries Kelley's (1967) proposal that causal attribution proceeds by utilization of Mill's (1872 Mill's ( /1973 method of difference along dimensions of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to its logical conclusion. Thus, given Kelley and Michela's (1980) definition of a cause as "that condition which is present when the effect is present and absent when the effect is absent" (p. 462), Jaspars et al. (1983) outline the rules of inference that go beyond and in some cases contradict the predictions made by previous interpretations of Kelley's ANOVA model (e.g., McArthur, 1972; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975) . In a critical test, the predictions of the natural logic model proved superior to those made by previous instantiations of the ANOVA model (Jaspars, 1983) .
Following the formalization of Mill's method of difference given in Mackie (1974) , the natural logic model described by Jaspars et al. (1983) can be characterized in the following terms.
The person, the stimulus, and the circumstances are all treated as possible causes of the target event. Consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information are coded to indicate whether the target event occurs or not in the presence or absence of each of the possible causes. A set of formal inference rules are provided that allow attributions to be deduced from particular configurations of the consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information. These quasi-syllogistic inference rules can be formally interpreted as defining an eight-fold truth table, in which values are selected on the basis of the presence or absence of the target person, stimulus, or circumstances, respectively, when the target event occurs (Jaspars, 1984) .
Despite the theoretical, methodological, and empirical advances over earlier interpretations of the ANOVA model made in the natural logic model, the natural logic model still has shortcomings as a model of the processes of lay causal attribution. Some of these are noted in Jaspars (1983) and will be discussed in more detail later in this article. At this point, all that needs to be noted is that certain patterns of responses on the attributional tasks indicate that subjects, at the very least, do not apply the method of difference in a perfect, content-free fashion in making their causal judgments. Given this finding, one line of theorizing has been to hypothesize biases in the subjects' applications of the formal rules of inference specified by the natural logic model (Jaspars, 1983; Jaspars et al. 1983) . The aim of the present article is to take a radically different perspective on the issue by assuming that the commonsense notion of causation does not appeal to the covariational criterion, as hypothesized by Kelley (1967) , but to the counterfactual and contrastive criteria of causal ascription, as unified in the notion of an abnormal condition. In addition, we argue that the contrastive criterion of causal ascription interacts with world knowledge about the normal states of affairs holding in the world to select as causes conditions that would not be so selected by the content-independent formal logical rules of inference specified in the natural logic model of causal attribution .
As such, the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution conforms to recent theorizing in cognitive psychology which hypothesizes that human inference processes do not proceed through the operation of formal rules of inference but through the operation of content-based nonlogical processes (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983) . The operation of such nonlogical processes is often hypothesized to explain biases from normative logical models. Indeed, we argue that apparent biases from normative logical inferences in the attribution process reflect attempts to draw conclusions that are informative given real-world knowledge (cf. Grice, 1975) . A direct analogy can be made to JohnsonLaird's (1983) demonstration that the valid deductions usually drawn in syllogistic reasoning tasks can be derived from the operation of Grice's (1975) maxim of quantity rather than through the operation of formal inference schemata.
This article has four main parts. In the first part, work in ordinary language philosophy is reviewed that indicates that commonsense reasoning does not appeal to the covariational criterion as understood by Hume and Mill, but to counterfactual and contrastive criteria. In the second part we outline an abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution that explicitly instantiates these counterfactual and contrastive criteria of causal ascription in a content-dependent model of the attribution process, and we compare its predictions with those made by the natural logic model, which instantiates content-independent formal logical rules of inference. In the third part we report two experiments designed to test predictions made by the abnormal conditions focus model, but not the natural logic model. In the fourth part we summarize the work reported and consider the more general implications of the view of causal attribution taken here, as contrasted with the prevailing man-the-scientist models employing content-independent criteria of causal attribution.
Covariational, Counterfactual, and Contrastive
Criteria for Causal Attribution
The application of the covariational criterion in causal attribution is not without its problems. One problem is that it clearly allows causal relationships that are spurious: For example, repeated observations of a correlation between an alarm clock going off and the sun rising clearly do not indicate that the alarm clock's ring causes the sun to rise. However, observation of the counterfactual case where the alarm did not go off one day would show that if the sun still rose that day, the alarm's ring was not a necessary condition for the sunrise.
Conversely, although sexual intercourse is commonly held to cause pregnancy, it does not always do so. The existence of repeated instances of cases where the condition (sexual intercourse) is present but the effect (pregnancy) is absent is problematic for the covariational principle of causal ascription. By the counterfactual criterion, however, sexual intercourse can be deemed a necessary condition for pregnancy inasmuch as the latter can never normally occur in the absence of the former.
However, the use of the counterfactual criterion to ascribe causality brings in train with it problems of causal selection. This is because, for any given event, there is normally a plethora of necessary conditions but for which the target event would not have occurred. This point may be illustrated by an example drawn from Hart and Honore (1959) . In explaining a train derailment, one can refer to any number of necessary conditions for the accident but for the presence of which the accident would not have occurred, such as the presence of a faulty rail, the weight of the wagons, and the speed at which the train was moving. The problem then becomes to specify which of this array of necessary conditions gets dignified as "the" cause in ordinary explanation.
This problem was noted by Mill (1872 Mill ( /1973 , who argued that the combination of the individually necessary but only jointly sufficient conditions constituted the true cause "philosophically speaking" (System of Logic, Book III, chapter v, section 3). Mill also observed that everyday explanation diverged from scientific explanation in "the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that we choose to designate the cause" (1872 . In other words, Mill was unable to discover any rules that determined the selection of the "cause" from the range of necessary conditions, attributing the variable selection to "the purpose of our immediate discourse" (p. 329).
However, Hart and Honore (1959) , in their analysis of commonsense concepts of causation as employed in legal discourse, indicate that the selection of the cause from the range of conditions necessary to the occurrence of an event is indeed orderly and rule-governed. They specify two criteria as being of paramount importance, namely, "the contrasts between what is normal and what is abnormal in relation to any given thing or subject matter, and between a free deliberate action and all other con-ditions" (p. 31). Mackie (1974) makes a similar proposal, albeit in slightly revised terms. However, we disregard the second of Hart and Honore's two criteria and concentrate instead on "the contrast between what is normal and what is abnormal." We refer to this as the contrastive criterion of causal attribution, although it would be more properly considered the contrastive criterion of causal selection. This is because the contrastive principle is used to select one of the range of necessary conditions, as evaluated by the counterfactual criterion, as "the" cause. In this view, abnormal conditions come to be dignified as the cause of an event because they are the necessary conditions for the occurrence of a target event that contrast with the conditions obtained in a comparison case where the target event did not occur.
The operation of the abnormal condition criterion for the assignment of causality can readily be illustrated with reference to the example of the train derailment given above. Hart and Honore (1959) noted that although the speed of the train and the weight of the wagons may be necessary conditions for the occurrence of the derailment, they are not abnormal conditions, because in the contrast (normal) case, trains run at the same speed and with wagons laden at the same weight without there being a derailment. The abnormal condition that distinguishes the target case from the contrast case is the faulty rail, which therefore becomes dignified as the cause. Those necessary conditions for the occurrence of the accident that are not abnormal, such as the train's speed and weight, are relegated to the status of mere conditions.
Of course, the definition of the abnormal condition will depend on the nature of the contrast case(s) chosen to compare the target event against. Both Hart and Honore (1959) and Mackie (1974) give the case of a man who suffers indigestion after eating parsnips. His doctor, who contrasts the man with his other patients, focuses on "something about the man" as the abnormal condition for and cause of the indigestion. On the other hand, the man's wife contrasts the case in which her husband eats parsnips with the case(s) in which he eats other vegetables and focuses on "something about the parsnips" as the abnormal condition for and cause of her husband's indigestion.
The above example also enables an illustration of how consensus and distinctiveness information may serve as contrast cases for a target event. From a disinterested point of view, we may wish not only to contrast the man with other men (consensus information) but also the parsnips with other vegetables he eats (distinctiveness information). We might also wish to contrast the current occasion on which the man eats parsnips with previous occasions on which he has eaten parsnips (consistency information). Assuming that the man always gets indigestion when he eats parsnips, the following pattern of information emerges:
The man suffers indigestion after eating parsnips.
Hardly anyone else suffers indigestion after eating parsnips. The man suffers indigestion after eating hardly any other vegetable. In the past the man has almost always suffered indigestion after eating parsnips.
Given that the target event is thus compared along dimensions of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information, the abnormal conditions focus model would predict attributions to both the person (the man) and the stimulus (the parsnips) because both, respectively, are abnormal conditions in the context of the consensus and distinctiveness information supplied. On the other hand, the consistency information indicates that there was nothing abnormal about the circumstances (present occasion) when the man ate parsnips, consequently leading to the relegation of the present occasion to the status of a mere condition.
Thus, it can be seen that the function of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information for causal attribution can be interpreted as the definition of contrast cases against which the target event is compared. Specifically, it is suggested that low consensus information (hardly anyone else does it) throws the target person into focus as abnormal, high distinctiveness information (the target person does it to hardly anything else) throws the target stimulus into focus as abnormal, and low consistency information (the target event has hardly ever happened before) throws the present circumstances into focus as abnormal. (The situation is actually more complicated than this in lay inference due to the operation of real-world knowledge. This will be further discussed in the next section.)
The Abnormal Conditions Focus Model of Causal Attribution: A First Approximation
The aim of the present analysis is to reanalyze subjects' performance on tasks designed to test previous theories of causal attribution (Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972) as showing that subjects may be employing the notion of an abnormal condition in making their causal judgment. In the present section, a simplified default version of the abnormal conditions focus model is described that illustrates the function of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information in furnishing informative contrast cases that enable the abnormal condition for the occurrence of the event to be focused upon.
The abnormal conditions focus model starts from the assumption, made by Hart and Honore (1959) and Mackie (1974) , that for any given target event there may be a plethora of necessary conditions for the occurrence of the event but for the presence of which the event would not have occurred. For example, if told that Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket, it might be assumed that Sally wanted to buy something, the supermarket had to be adequately stocked, Sally's car had to be working, and so on, for the event to occur. Such assumptions would be natural and commonplace to make, given certain conversational conventions (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983) , and would constitute the presupposed causal field of background necessary conditions hypothesized by Mackie (1974) .
Given such assumptions, then qualities of the person (Sally), the stimulus (the supermarket), and the circumstances (e.g., Sally's car had to be working, the supermarket had to be open) are all necessary for the event to occur. However, all of the conditions alluded to above may fairly be considered trivial because they normally hold for all visits to all supermarkets. Although, by the counterfactual criterion, all of these conditions are necessary for Sally to buy something on her visit to the supermarket, to remark on any one of them as the cause of her action would not tell the enquirer (in this case the experimenter) anything new about the event that he or she could not presuppose from general knowledge about what people do on their visits to supermarkets. To remark upon such an unremarkable condition as the cause of Sally's action in buying something on her visit to the supermarket would violate Grice's maxim of quantity (informativeness), which states, inter alia, that a speaker must not tell a listener something that he or she already knows (Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1983) .
The fully cooperative subject's task in an attribution experiment is, therefore, to identify a necessary condition that cannot be presupposed from the general knowledge of the world shared by the subject with the experimenter, and that is therefore in some sense abnormal. The addition of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency forms of information can thus be interpreted as informative in that they provide contrast cases that render some aspect of the focused event abnormal. For example, high consensus information renders the person as normal when compared to other people and is uninformative given our presuppositions about what normally happens when people visit supermarkets:
Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket. Almost everyone else bought something on their visits to this supermarket.
Likewise, low distinctiveness information renders the supermarket normal when compared to other supermarkets and is uninformative given our presuppositions about what normally happens when people visit supermarkets:
Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket. Sally buys something on her visit to almost every other supermarket.
However, low consistency information would indicate that there is something abnormal about the present circumstances (the present visit to the supermarket):
Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket. In the past, Sally has hardly ever bought something on her visit to this supermarket. This low consistency information would, unlike the high consensus and low distinctiveness information, be informative because it would suggest that there was something unusual about Sally's action in buying something on her visit to the supermarket, namely, the present occasion as contrasted to all the previous occasions when she visited this supermarket but did not buy anything. Consequently, this high consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency (HLL) configuration would lead to an attribution to the present occasion, corresponding to circumstance attributions indicated for the same information configuration by other theorists (Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orvis et al., 1975) . What these other theorists do not predict is either that low consistency information will be judged informative about the present occasion because it tells us something new about the present occasion, that it is abnormal, or that high consensus and low distinctiveness will be judged as uninformative about the person (Sally) and the stimulus (the supermarket) because they do not add any new information that could not be reasonably presupposed from general knowledge about visits to supermarkets.
The contrast between the effect of low and high consensus information is somewhat more complex. Unlike high consensus information, low consensus information (e.g., hardly anyone else buys something from this supermarket) is informative because it renders the target person (Sally) as abnormal in comparison with other people and thus enables her to be dignified as the cause of the event inasmuch as she is an abnormal condition. The complication arises in that low consensus information may also be informative about the stimulus (the supermarket) because supermarkets in which people do not buy things are unusual. However, low consensus information does not identify the stimulus (the supermarket) as an abnormal condition for the event, because this information indicates that this supermarket inhibits rather than facilitates buying behavior in its visitors. An inhibitory condition cannot explain the occurrence of a behavior; hence, although low consensus information is informative about the stimulus, it does not enable the identification of the stimulus as an abnormal condition qua facilitative cause.
The contrast between high and low distinctiveness is similarly complex. Thus, unlike low distinctiveness, high distinctiveness information (e.g., Sally buys something at hardly any other supermarket she visits) is informative about the stimulus (the supermarket) and enables its identification as the cause of the target event because it is an abnormal condition when compared with other supermarkets Sally visits. However, high distinctiveness information is also generally informative about an abnormal feature of the person (Sally) which generally inhibits her from buying things on her visits to supermarkets. But because this feature is also an inhibitory condition, high distinctiveness information, however informative, does not enable us to dignify Sally as the cause of the event inasmuch as she is not a facilitative abnormal condition (cf. Hansen, 1980) .
The above complications noted in the function of consensus and distinctiveness information in enabling causal attribution plague attribution theory in general. Thus, although low consensus information and high distinctiveness information enable attribution of general dispositional characteristics to the stimulus and the person, respectively, to take place (in the sense of Jones & Davis, 1965) , they do not enable attributions of causality that serve as explanations for the particular target event (in the sense of Kelley, 1972; McArthur, 1972) to take place. The dual roles of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information in enabling attributions of both facilitatory and inhibitory causal characteristics are clearly distinguished in the formulation of the abnormal conditions focus model. Thus, it will be shown that not all cases where consensus and distinctiveness information yield information gain about the dispositional characteristics of the person and the stimulus (dispositional attributions) also yield causal attributions for the occurrence of the target event (causal explanations).
Given the above assumptions (with their qualifications), it is now possible to present the default version of the abnormal conditions focus model. The model has four rules, which can be stated as follows:
1. Assume that features of the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances are each necessary conditions, and hence, possible causes (cf. Mackie, 1974) , for the occurrence of the target event.
2. If low consensus information indicates that the target person is unusual, dignify the person as the abnormal condition causing the event.
3. If high distinctiveness information indicates that the stimulus is unusual, dignify the stimulus as the abnormal condition causing the event.
4. If low consistency information indicates that the present occasion (circumstances) is unusual, dignify the present occasion as the abnormal condition causing the event.
Any necessary conditions for the occurrence of the target event that are not identified as abnormal are relegated to the status of mere conditions, in the sense of Hart and Honore (1959) . Table  1 shows the predictions for each configuration of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information made by this default version of the abnormal conditions focus model. The full version of the model, with its supplementary rules, is discussed later.
Comparison of the Default Abnormal Conditions Focus
Model With the Natural Logic Model of Causal Attribution
The default version of the abnormal conditions focus model is so termed because subjects' real-world knowledge plays no part in defining what constitutes an informative contrast and, hence, an abnormal condition. In this respect, the default abnormal conditions focus model is similar to the content-independent natural logic model proposed by Jaspars et al. (1983) . However, its difference lies in the method whereby attributional inferences are hypothesized to be drawn. The abnormal conditions focus model utilizes the contrastive criterion to select as cause(s) the necessary condition(s) that are abnormal given the accompanying consensus, distinetiveness, and consistency information. The natural logic model accomplishes the same task through the operation of formal inference schemata.
From Table 1 it can be seen that the default abnormal conditions focus model predicts particular causal attributions to seven of the information configurations and no causal attribution in the high consensus, low distinetiveness, high consistency (HLH) cell. The first seven predictions appear to correspond exactly to those made by the natural logic model and supported by an experiment to test the predictions of the natural logic model (Jaspars, 1983) . Thus, in default of the operation of world knowledge in defining informative contrasts, the abnormal conditions focus model predicts the same responses that the natural logic model predicts. However, it is possible to adduce some advantages of the default abnormal conditions focus model over the natural logic model.
The first is that of parsimony. The rules of the abnormal conditions focus model are relatively simple when compared with the rules of the natural logic model. As such, they are intuitively more appealing as a representation of commonsense reasoning.
The second is that the notions of presupposition and focus employed in the abnormal conditions focus model are able to provide an explanation for the tendency of subjects to treat the circumstances as necessary but not sufficient conditions . The expression the circumstances, as used in the response language of studies such as McArthur (1972) , could conceivably be interpreted by subjects as referring to the presupposed background conditions for the occurrence of the target event understood by Mackie's (1974) notion of a causal field. For Mackie (1974) the cause is that condition which is "sufficient in the circumstances" of presupposed background conditions. Hence, "the circumstances" would be interpreted as referring to a set of presupposed necessary but not sufficient conditions. Such an interpretation would be consistent with the response Note. Cs/D/Cy = consensus/distinctiveness/consistency; H = high; L = low(e.g., HHH = high consensus, high distinetiveness, high consistency); P = person; S = stimulus; C = circumstances.
biases in attribution experiments such as those of McArthur (1972) , as noted by Jaspars et al. (1983) . However, the abnormal conditions focus model as described so far is not complete. In particular, the predictions it will make for the high consensus, low distinetiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration have not been discussed in detail. However, it is in predicting responses to this HLH configuration that the advantages of the abnormal conditions focus model over the natural logic model as an account of causal attribution can be most clearly substantiated. This is because it enables a clear demonstration of how presupposed world knowledge interacts with the contrastive principle to define abnormal conditions and, hence, causes in a way not predicted by the content-independent rules employed in the natural logic model.
Presupposed Norms and the Definition of Abnormal Conditions
The high consensus, low distinetiveness, high consistency (HLH) information configuration provides an interesting test case for attribution theory. The natural logic model (Jaspars, 1983 ) predicts that no attribution is possible for this configuration inasmuch as the target behavior does not appear to covary with the presence or absence of any of the involved entities. Yet subjects show a clear preference for certain responses to this HLH configuration, namely, the combination of the person and the stimulus (PS; 27%), the person (P; 23%), and the stimulus (S; 20%).
In the present section, a line of analysis is developed which suggests that the abnormal conditions focus model can readily explain these seemingly anomalous responses to the high consensus, low distinetiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration, provided that the role of presupposed norms associated with the target event in defining abnormal conditions is fully recognized.
As a first step in explicating the role of norms in causal attribution, it is worth noting that the target event used as an example to introduce the default version of the abnormal conditions focus model is a stereotyped, routine behavior or "script" (Schank & Abelson, 1977) , known by and adhered to by all competent members of modern Western society (i.e., Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket). When given this piece of information, the competent listener (Grice, 1975) might reasonably presuppose that (a) almost everyone else buys something on their visit to this supermarket, (b) Sally buys something in almost every other supermarket she visits, and (c) in the past Sally has almost always bought something on her visits to this supermarket. In the language of attribution theory, the supermarket script has a high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) causal schema associated with it (cf. Kelley, 1972) . However, given the existence of such an HLH causal schema, or set of presuppositions associated with the scripted event, to give high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency information in an explicit form, as in attributional experiments (e.g., Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972) would not be informative about the target event, and so no abnormal condition could be focused on.
By contrast, an HLH configuration would be perceived as highly informative about a script deviation such as "Mary buys nothing on her visit to the supermarket." Adding the information that (a) almost everyone else buys nothing on their visit to this supermarket, (b) Mary buys nothing at almost every other supermarket she visits, and (c) in the past Mary has almost always bought nothing at this supermarket would be perceived as extremely informative given the presuppositions about normal behavior in supermarkets. Intuitively, the HLH configuration seems to suggest something abnormal about Mary and this supermarket that caused her to deviate from the conventional script. Thus, particular information configurations are not intrinsically informative; they only have information value with respect to presupposed norms associated with the target event. Consequently, the informativeness of explicit consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information will interact with whether the target event is scripted or not.
Clearly, scripted behavior and script deviations refer to events that are extremely usual (normal) and extremely unusual (abnormal), respectively. The norms may be stated as, respectively, normally everyone buys something on their every visit to the supermarket and normally no one buys nothing on their every visit to the supermarket. Scripted behavior and script deviations are extremes on the scale of normality; either almost everyone or hardly anyone produces the behavior in question.
In contrast, ordinary actions that are neither scripted nor script deviant are not located on the extreme ends of the continuum of normality. If one hears that Sue is afraid of the dog, one probably makes the assumption that normally some people are afraid of some dogs. This presupposition has the interesting consequence that, unlike the case of scripted actions, high consensus information is informative about the stimulus and low distinctiveness information is informative about the person. Thus, high consensus information (everyone else is afraid of the dog) enables the inference that there is something unusual about this stimulus (the dog), whereas in the case of high consensus information about a scripted behavior of buying something on a visit to the supermarket, the statement "Everyone else buys something on their visit to the supermarket" is uninformative. From the point of view of content-independent covariational and formal logical analyses, both items of high consensus information are objectively the same; however, one defines an abnormal condition (e.g., the dog is unusually fierce) whereas the other does not (e.g., the supermarket attracts a lot of shopping).
Similar effects of presupposed norms on causal attribution can be observed in the interpretation of distinctiveness information. Thus, "Sue is afraid of almost every other dog" (low distinctiveness information) enables the inference of some abnormal quality about the person (e.g., Sue is timid) that facilitates her fear. In contrast, in the scripted case, "Sally buys something at almost every other supermarket she visits" (low distinctiveness information) does not define any abnormal condition (e.g., Sally is the sort of person who buys things on her visits to supermarkets).
If this analysis is correct, then we are in a position to explain subjects' responses to the high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration in experiments such as McArthur (1972) and Jaspars (1983) as evidence for the full version of the abnormal conditions focus model. Where nonscripted target events are used (e.g., Sue is afraid of the dog), both the person (from the low distinctiveness information) and the stimulus (from the high consensus information) are identified as abnormal conditions. This prediction receives prima facie confirmation from the results of previous experiments (e.g., Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orvisetal., 1975) . However, where the target event is scripted (e.g., Sally bought something on her visit to the supermarket), the HLH configuration allows no abnormal condition to be identified, and therefore no contrastive causal attribution is possible. In such a case, the only attribution possible is to a necessary condition for the target event that is not abnormal; in other words, nothing special can be said to have caused the event.
Summary of the Abnormal Conditions Focus Model
The fundamental hypothesis of the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution is that subjects treat consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information as contrast cases that define the abnormal conditions facilitating the production of the target event. Abnormal conditions focused in this way are dignified as the causes of the target event.
The predictions made by the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 , which represent the attribution process in three parts. Judgments of the informativeness of the separate dimensions of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information together with judgments of the facilitatory or inhibitory nature of abnormal conditions are presented in Table 2 , whilst causal attributions to configurations of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information are presented in Table 3 . Two columns of predictions are listed in Table 2 , corresponding to those predictions made for ordinary nonscripted events without extreme norms and those made for scripted events with extreme norms. Table 3 shows the effect of adding the abnormal conditions facilitating the production of nonscripted events as focused by consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to produce causal attributions. Only the four configurations containing high consistency information are given, reflecting the observation that, whereas consensus and distinctiveness information interact in the effects of judgments of the person and the stimulus, consistency information seems to be chiefly limited in its effect to judgments of the present occasion or circumstances (cf. Hansen, 1980) . However, it should be noted that this is a simplifying assumption.
The predictions made for scripted events (e.g., Mary buys something on her visit to the supermarket) with extreme norms (e.g., all people buy something on their visits to all supermarkets) are different in important respects from those made for nonscripted events. The two key differences are that for scripted events, high consensus does not focus the stimulus as a facilitatory abnormal condition and low distinctiveness does not focus the person as a facilitatory abnormal condition. Consequently, as Table 2 shows, high consensus and low distinctiveness have no effects on judgments of causality for scripted events (being uninformative). This in turn implies that no contrastive causal attribution is possible for scripted events given a high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency configuration (Table 3) .
Hence, the key distinguishing prediction made for the abnormal conditions focus model as contrasted to the content-independent predictions of the formal natural logic model of Jaspars et al. (1983) is that giving high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) information will define the person and the stimulus as abnormal conditions for the occurrence of nonscripted target events but will not define any abnormal conditions for the occurrence of scripted target events. The HLH configuration therefore predicts attributions to the person and the stimulus for nonscripted events but will not allow contrastive attributions for scripted events.
However, within nonscripted events, an interesting secondary prediction can be made about differences in the perceived informaliveness of consensus and distinctiveness information about actions as opposed to emotions. Previous work suggests a tendency for actions to be attributed to the person and circumstances, and emotions to the stimulus and circumstances (McArthur, 1972) . According to Kelley's notion of causal schemata (Brown & Fish, 1983; Kelley, 1973) , this should indicate a low consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency (LLL) configuration associated with actions and a high consensus, high distinctiveness, low consistency configuration (HHL) associated with emotions. Hence, low consensus information should be more informative about the person and the stimulus in the case of emotions rather than actions, but high distinctiveness information should be more informative about the person and the stimulus in the case of actions rather than emotions. High consensus should be more informative about the stimulus in the case of actions than in the case of emotions, and low distinctiveness should be more informative about the person in the case of emotions than in the case of actions.
The above predictions of the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution are open to empirical test. However, certain procedural innovations will be necessary. These are (a) a new independent variable (i.e., the explicit manipulation of the presupposed normality of the target event), (b) a new dependent variable (i.e., judgments of the informativeness of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information in denning abnormal conditions for the target event), and (c) a new response format for causal attribution (i.e., allowing a default judgment indicating that no contrastive attribution is possible).
Thus, although several previous studies have produced results that are consistent with the analysis given by the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution, none have fulfilled any of the three procedural requirements listed above (e.g., Hansen, Note. P = person; S = stimulus; C = circumstances; HCs -high consensus information; LCs = low consensus information; LD = low distinctiveness information; HD = high distinctiveness information; fac = type of information (Cs or D) is perceived as indicating that P or S is a facilitative condition; inh = type of information (Cs or D) is perceived as indicating that P or S is an inhibitory condition; 0 = P or S is not perceived as either a facilitatory or inhibitory condition given the type of information.
Table 3 Judgments of Causality Predicted by the Abnormal Conditions Focus Model of Causal Attribution
1980; Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orviset al., 1975) . Next, we report two empirical studies that, between them, fulfill these three requirements. The first study fulfills the first two requirements of manipulating the presupposed norms associated with the target event as an independent variable and collects judgments of the informativeness of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information as the dependent variable. The second study uses a new response format to test for the effect of manipulations of (he presupposed normativeness of the target event on causal attribution proper.
Experiment 1 Major Experimental Hypotheses
1. For nonscripted events without extreme norms (actions and emotions), low consensus information is judged as more informative about the person than is high consensus information; high distinctiveness information is judged as more informative about the stimulus than is low distinctiveness information; low consistency information is judged as more informative about the circumstances than is high consistency information.
2. Similar predictions to Hypothesis 1 can be made for scripted events with extreme norms, except that the effects should be more marked due to the extremity of the norms. However, there should be a crossover effect of script deviations as compared to scripts on the effect of high consensus, low distinctiveness, and high consistency (HLH) information. Thus, relative to scripted events, high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) information should be judged as more informative than low consensus, high distinctiveness, and low consistency (LHL) for script deviations with presupposed norms of low consensus, high distinctiveness, and low consistency (LHL).
3. Qualitative differences in the utilization of consensus and distinctiveness information can be predicted for scripted events as opposed to nonscripted events (actions and emotions) and script deviations. Thus, high consensus information is judged as more informative about the stimulus and low distinctiveness information is judged as more informative about the person for actions, emotions, and script deviations than for scripted events.
4. Within nonscripted events, low consensus is more informative about the person for emotions than actions, and high consensus is more informative about the person for actions than emotions. High distinctiveness is more informative about the stimulus for actions than emotions, and low distinctiveness is more informative about the stimulus for emotions than actions.
Subjects
Twenty-seven women and 21 men ranging in age from 18 to 50 years (M -31.0; SD = 10.6) were recruited from the subject panel of the Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford. Subjects were run individually and received their questionnaires (described below) as part of a battery of four independent experimental tasks. All subjects were paid £ 1.50 (approximately $2) for their participation.
Format of the Questionnaire
The questionnaires presented the subjects with eight target events, two each of actions ("Jerry chases the cat," "The golfer hits the bunker"), emotions ("John laughs at the comedian," "Sue is afraid of the dog"), scripted events ("Mary buys something on her visit to the supermarket," "Roger reads the menu in the restaurant"), and script deviations ("Mary buys nothing on her visit to the supermarket," "Roger asks the waiter to tell him the dishes in the restaurant"). Partial counterbalancing was achieved by administering one order of the eight events to one half of the subjects and a different order to the other half. Both orders were chosen so as to maintain a maximal separation between events of the same type.
Crossed with order of events, half of the subjects were presented with covariation information in a high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration, whereas the other half received a low consensus, high distinctiveness, low consistency (LHL) configuration. Within each of these conditions, the order of presentation of covariation information was fully counterbalanced. Following each piece of covariation information were three 7-point response scales on which subjects were asked to rate "the extent to which you feel this observation tells you something new about" the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances.
Results
A 2 X 8 (Information Level X Event Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was first computed. Inspection of the means of each of the two instances of each event type (action, emotion, script, script deviation) revealed that they were similar enough to be collapsed without substantial loss of information. The one exception was the script deviation "Roger asks the waiter to tell him the dishes in the restaurant," which did not produce such marked effects as the other script deviation, "Mary buys nothing on her visit to the supermarket." This may be in part due to the fact that subjects found the former script deviation unidiomatic and difficult to comprehend. However, although manipulations of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information did not show such strong effects on judgments of informativeness in the case of the former script deviation as in the case of the latter, in both cases the direction of the effects was the same. It was therefore decided that collapsing the scores of the two script deviations was justified.
The results of the manipulations of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on perceived informativeness about the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances are given in Figures 1, 2 , and 3. Two separate ANOVAS were computed, one contrasting actions with emotions and the other contrasting scripted events with script deviations. The F values and significance levels are given in Table 4 . The perceived informativeness of manipulations of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information is discussed first.
As predicted in the first hypothesis, for nonscripted events (actions and emotions) low consensus was judged more informative about the person than was high consensus, F( 1, 46) = 13.68, p < .001; high distinctiveness was judged more informative about the stimulus than was low distinctiveness, F( 1, 46) = 15.50, p < .0005; and low consistency was judged more informative about the circumstances than was high consistency, F( 1, 46) = 13.16, .p <.001.
As predicted in the second hypothesis, there was an interaction between information level and event type reflecting a crossover effect in judgments of informativeness as a function of whether the target event was a scripted event or a script deviation. Thus, there were interactions between information level and event type (script vs. script deviation) in the perceived informativeness of The second hypothesis also predicted that consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information would be more informative about scripted events than about events with midlevel norms (actions and emotions). The relevant contrasts involve the relative magnitudes of the effects of variation in consensus information on informativeness about the person, the effects of variation in distinctiveness information on informativeness about the stimulus, and the effects of variation in consistency information on informativeness about the circumstances for scripts versus actions and emotions. These contrasts were tested by comparing the appropriate point-biserial correlations, yielding the following results: When the target event was a script, consensus information was only marginally more informative about the person than if the target event was an action, z = 1,52, p < .07, or an emotion, z = 1.19, p < .13; distinctiveness information was significantly more informative about the stimulus than if the target event was an action, z = 2.14, p < .025, or an emotion, z = 2.09, p < .025; and consistency information was significantly more informative about the circumstances than if the target event was an action, 2 = 4.38, p < .001, or an emotion, z = 4.25, p < .001. Thus, overall, the hypothesis found support in the data.
The third hypothesis that high consensus information would be perceived as informative about the stimulus and low distinctiveness information informative about the person for nonscripted events (actions and emotions) and script deviations but not for scripted events was confirmed. Thus, there were in the contrast between scripted events and script deviations highly significant interactions between event type and information level on perceived informativeness of consensus information about the stimulus, f(\, 46) -= 34.87, p < .0001, and of distinctiveness information about the person, F(l, 46) = 21.60, p < .0001. However, the interaction between event type and information level on perceived informativeness of consensus information about the stimulus was not significant, f{\, 46) = 1.75. In addition, the interaction between event type and information level on perceived informativeness of distinctiveness information about the person, although unpredictcd, was small, F( 1,46) = 4.21, p < .05. However, as predicted, high consensus information was found to be more informative about the stimulus for actions, /(46) -5.39, p < .001, and emotions, ((46) = 6.99, p < .001, than for scripted events. Similarly, low distinctiveness information was more informative about the person when the target event was an action, <(46) = 5.49, p < .001, or an emotion, ;(46) = 4.54, p < .001, than when it was a script.
The fourth hypothesis that consensus and distinctiveness information would be differentially informative about the person and the stimulus as a function of whether the target event was an action or an emotion was disconfirmed. Thus, the predicted interactions between event type and information level in judgments of the informativeness of consensus about the person, F( 1, 46) = 1.90, ns, and distinctiveness about the stimulus. F( 1,46) = 0.04, ns, did not occur. Unpredicted main effects were obtained for event type on judgments of the informativeness of distinctiveness information about the stimulus, f\l, 46) = 5.59, p < .05, indicating that both high and low distinctiveness information were judged as more informative about the stimulus when the target event was an emotion than when it was an action.
In addition, unpredicted main effects of event type (action versus emotion) on perceived informativeness were found in that both high and low consensus information were perceived as more informative about the stimulus when the target event was an emotion than when it was an action, F( 1,46) = 16.31, p< .0005, as were both high and low consistency information, f\ 1, 46) = 5.05, p < .05.
If it can be assumed that subjects are aware, at some level, of the relatively reflexlike nature of emotions as compared with actions (cf. Burstein, 1977) , then one possible explanation for these last three results is that the presupposed range of variation of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency with respect to the stimulus is smaller for emotions than it is for actions. Hence, the same degree of difference from the norm ("almost all," "hardly any") would be more informative for emotions than actions because it is more likely to be abnormal. A useful analogy can be made to tests of significance: The smaller the standard deviation in a population, the more likely that a difference from the mean will be significant.
The analogy with tests of significance can be extended to explain other results not predicted by the model, as given in Table  2 . For example, if one assumes, given that Sue is afraid of the dog, that on average 30% of people are afraid of the dog, then high consensus information that almost everyone else (90%) is afraid of the dog will be more informative about this particular dog (it is very fierce) than low consensus information that hardly anyone else (10%) is afraid of the dog (the dog is fairly tame). Fixing the assumed mean of the population distribution in this way would explain why high consensus information is more informative about the stimulus than is low consensus information for actions and emotions, F(l, 46) = 10.33, p < .005. A similar rationale may be advanced for other main effects that were not predicted in Table 2 , yet that would still be consistent with the central hypothesis of the abnormal conditions focus model, that it is deviation from a presupposed norm that affects perceived informativeness.
Presupposed Norms and Causal Attribution
In Experiment I, the patterns of perceived informativeness of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information about the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances predicted by the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution were tested for and observed. However, the effects of variations in presupposed norms on causal attribution per se predicted by the abnormal conditions focus model have yet to be tested. Thus, it was suggested that variations in perceived abnormality would be able to resolve certain discrepancies between the predictions made by previous models of causal attribution and obtained data. In particular, it is hypothesized that variations in presupposed norms associated with the target event will cause variations in causal attributions to the high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) information configuration as predicted by the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution (see Table 3 ) but not previous theories of causal attribution (e.g., Jaspars, 1983; Jasparsetal., 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orvisetal., 1975) .
Inspection of Jaspars's (1983) data provides prima facie support for the analysis provided by the abnormal conditions focus model. Thus, in accordance with the abnormal conditions focus model, subjects show a marked tendency to attribute the cause of an event to "something about the combination of the person and the stimulus" given a high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration, for which the natural logic model predicts no attribution. The cell "something about the combination of the person and the stimulus" should, according to Jaspars's (1983) natural logic model, only be used given a low consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency (LHH) configuration.
However, it should be noted that the attributional category "something about the combination of the person and the stimulus" may have a different subjective meaning when employed in response to a high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration than when it is employed in response to a low consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency (LHH) configuration. As McArthur (1972) notes, the former HLH configuration may lead to an attribution to the person and the stimulus as multiple sufficient causes, whereas the latter may lead to an attribution to the person and the stimulus as multiple necessary causes. In McArthur's example, the HLH configuration Ralph trips over Joan dancing.
Almost everyone else trips up over Joan dancing. Ralph trips up over almost everyone else dancing. In the past Ralph has almost always tripped over Joan dancing.
would lead to the inferences that Ralph is a clod and Joan is a clod (multiple sufficient causes). By contrast, the LHH configuration Ralph trips over Joan dancing.
Hardly anyone else trips up over Joan dancing. Ralph trips up over hardly anyone else dancing. In the past Ralph has almost always tripped up over Joan dancing.
would lead to the inference that Ralph and Joan don't swing together (multiple necessary causes).
The analyses of Jaspars (1983) and McArthur (1972) clearly diverge as to predictions about subjects' responses to the HLH configuration. Although Jaspars's (1983) own data support McArthur's predictions about responses to the HLH configuration, as Jaspars points out (Jaspars, 1983; Jaspars et al., 1983) , his analysis makes more accurate predictions about responses to the other configurations than does Kelley's ANOVA model as tested by McArthur (1972) and Orvis et al. (1975) .
However, the position can be resolved through recourse to an analysis that takes the presupposed norms related to the target event into explicit account, as the abnormal conditions focus model does. The analysis provided by the abnormal conditions focus model can be subjected to empirical test, because different attributions can be predicted in response to the high consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (HLH) configuration as a function of the presupposed norms related to the target event, as manipulated by the target event's scripted or nonscripted nature. It is to a critical experiment designed to settle this issue that we now turn.
Experiment 2

Hypotheses
In particular, from the data collected in Experiment 1 on the content-related effects of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on perceived informativeness, the following critical predictions can be made:
1. An HLH configuration for a scripted action such as "Mary bought something on her visit to the supermarket" should produce no contrastive causal attribution at all, because there is no abnormal condition to focus upon.
2. An HLH configuration for a nonscripted action such as "Ralph trips over Joan dancing" should produce a causal attribution to both the person and the stimulus, because they both can be perceived as sufficient causes that made the difference to the occurrence of the target event, given the crossover effects of consensus and distinctiveness on judgments about the person and the stimulus found in Experiment I.
3. An HLH configuration for a script deviation such as "The customer didn't tip the waiter" should produce a causal attribution to both the person and the stimulus as sufficient causes, for the same reasons given in Hypothesis 2.
4. The HLH configuration for nonscripted actions and for script deviations should produce an attribution to the person and the stimulus as mutliple sufficient causes (MSC), whereas the low consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency (LHH) information configurations should produce attributions to the person and the stimulus as multiple necessary causes (MNC) which are only jointly sufficient.
Construction of the Response Format
To test the above predictions, a response format that allowed a response equivalent to a null attribution had to be constructed, because previous response formats did not explicitly allow such a response category (e.g., Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972) . The formulation "nothing special about this person, this stimulus, or this particular occasion, or any combination of the three" was employed as the null attribution response because it was relatively idiomatic and likely to be interpreted consistently by the subjects, as well as corresponding to the notion of causality being tested in the experiment (i.e., by the counterfactual criterion, the cause of Mary's buying something at the supermarket might be hypothesized to be her wanting some food, but that would not be perceived as an abnormal or special cause).
Care was taken to construct a response format that corresponded as closely as possible to that used by Jaspars (1983) . Thus, the seven possible response categories employed by Jaspars were reproduced, with the modification that where Jaspars's response format referred to "something about X," the present format amended the stem to "something special about X" (e.g., Mary or this supermarket) in order to retain consistency with the null attribution category. However, to check that "something special about X" captured the same operational meaning as the original "something about X," three extra configurations corresponding to the three single-factor information templates specified by Jaspars (1983; Jaspars et al., 1983) were included to see if the predicted attributions to the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances, respectively, ensued. It was assumed that if they did, the formulations "something special about X" and "something about X" could be treated as functionally equivalent in causal attribution.
However, it was anticipated that the attributional response "something about the circumstances" was liable to produce problems of interpretation. In general, it is a relatively underused category (cf. Jaspars et al., 1983) . More specifically, in the present study it was anticipated that "something special about the circumstances" was liable to be interpreted as equivalent to "something special about the situation." Given this interpretation, subjects could be expected to attribute the cause of the scripted action to "something special about the circumstances," intending their response to be taken to refer to the situation-specific nature of the scripted action. Hence, it was decided to reformulate "the circumstances" as "this particular occasion" because this definition seemed to capture the meaning Kelley (1967) had in mind for "the circumstances" without running the risk of being overinclusive because of ambiguity. A tendency for this response category to be elicited by the high consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency (HLL) information configuration but no other would attest to the success of this formulation.
Another response category was also added in order to distinguish attributions to a combination of the person and the stimulus where both were perceived as necessary but only jointly sufficient conditions (predicted for the low consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency [LHH] configuration where the target event is an unscripted event). For the multiple necessary causes (MNC) reponse condition, the formulation employed was "something special about the combination of this person and this stimulus (only when they are together)." For the multiple sufficient causes (MSC) response condition, the formulation employed was "something special about this person and something special about this stimulus (even when they are not together)."
Finally, one procedural difference to the method used by Jaspars (1983) to collect responses should be noted. It was decided to have subjects rate how complete they considered each explanation to be, instead of selecting one response category as "the" attribution.
Subjects
Twenty-six women and six men ranging in age from 16 to 25 years (M = 17.5; SD -1.9) from the College of Further Education, Oxford, England, filled out the questionnaires. The subjects, drawn from nursing and introductory psychology courses, participated during their regularly scheduled class times.
Counterbalancing
Each of the 32 subjects received a different order of the eight events used in the questionnaire. Order was determined by drawing, on an alternating basis, from two 4X4 latin squares, one of which balanced the three events associated with the information templates that the natural logic model predicts will produce single-factor attributions to the person, the stimulus, and the circumstances, plus that associated with the LHH configuration, and one of which balanced the three events associated with the HLH configuration plus an additional HHH configuration (which was included for reasons that are not pertinent to the present discussion). After the 16 possible orders had been exhausted in this fashion, the process was reversed by drawing first from that latin square which was chosen from second in the previous round.
Results
The cell means of subjects' ratings in each of the nine response categories are given in Table 5 . First of all, inspection of the low consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (LLH-person attribution); high consensus, high distinctiveness, high consistency (HHH-stimulus attribution); and high consensus, low distinctiveness, low consistency (HLL-circumstance/occasion attribution) configurations indicated that the response format employed in the present experiment produced response patterns isomorphic to those produced in previous experiments (e.g., Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orvis et al. 1975) . Thus, the eight experimental conditions had a significant effect on attributions to the person, attributions to the stimulus, and attributions to the particular occasion (i.e., circumstances). Planned comparisons between the means of the predicted cells and the means of the combined remaining cells showed significant tendencies for subjects to produce the predicted responses for the LLH configuration, ((248) = 9.46; the HHH configurations, ft(248) = 11.24 and 8.02; the HLL configuration, ((248) = 5.90; and the LHH configuration, /(248) = 9.46; allps < .001. In summary, therefore, the substitution of "something special about X" for "something about X" in the response format did not appear to alter the subjects' pattern of the response to the four canonical types of information configuration tested. Thus, the present procedure appears to be testing the same notions of causality as those addressed in comparable attribution experiments. This in itself may be taken as evidence of the equivalence of the commonsense notion of cause tested in previous attribution experiments (e.g., McArthur, 1972) with the notion of an abnormal condition.
Overall, the four major predictions provided support for the abnormal conditions focus model. Each will be discussed in turn.
The first hypothesis predicted that the null attribution response ("nothing special about the person, this stimulus, this particular occasion, or any combination of the three") would be produced by the HLH information configuration when the target event was a scripted action. The hypothesis was confirmed: Subjects rated this cell significantly higher than the other eight response categories combined, 1(248) = 9.28, p < .001. To test the second and third hypotheses, planned comparisons were computed contrasting the person, stimulus, and person plus stimulus cells against the means of the remaining cells in the HLH nonscripted action and script deviation conditions. The second hypothesis was confirmed: Subjects rated the MSC (multiple sufficient causes) cell highest when the target behavior was a nonscripted event, ;(248) = 5.68, p < .001. The third hypothesis was marginally confirmed, in that subjects gave an overall higher rating to the MSC cell than the mean of the other cells in the script deviation condition combined, ((248) = 2.71, p < .005. Subjects also gave overall higher ratings to the separate person and stimulus cells both when the target behavior was a nonscripted event, (s(248) = 3.02, p < .005, and 4.43, p < .001, respectively, and when it was a script deviation, (s(248) = 3.59, p < .001, and 5.08, p < .001, respectively. The finding that the person, stimulus, and person plus stimulus cells were the three highest rated in both conditions is not surprising given that the MSC schema necessarily implies two separate main effect explanations.
The fourth hypothesis appeared to be confirmed: The MNC (multiple necessary causes) cell was rated highest in the LHH configuration, ((248) = 9.28, p < .001, a finding that, taken together with the above results, appears to confirm that subjects can distinguish between MSC (person plus stimulus) attributions and truly interactional (person by stimulus) attributions.
Discussion
Experiment 2 overall offers clear support for the full version of the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution by showing an isomorphism between the effects of presupposed norms on both the perceived informativeness of consensus and distinctiveness information about the person and the stimulus, on the one hand, and attributions of causality to the person and the stimulus, on the other hand. The impact of these results is that the role of perceived norms needs to be specified in any complete model of causal attribution. Whilst perceived normality of behavior is a central construct in the model of causal attribution proposed by Jones (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976) , such a construct is absent from the ANOVA model of attribution and its derivates, which only consider whether an effect is present or absent, not whether it is normal (Jaspars, 1983; Kelley, 1967 Kelley, , 1972 Kelley, , 1973 Orvis et al., 1975) . The present study has demonstrated the need to consider the role of subjective norms associated with the target event even within the experimental paradigm customarily employed to test the ANOVA model of causal attribution and its derivates (cf. Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Orvis et al., 1975) .
Conclusions
The two experiments reported in this study have satisfied the three criteria specified for an adequate test of the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution in that they (a) have varied the presupposed norms associated with the target event; (b) have shown the effects of variations of these presupposed norms on judgments of the informativeness of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information; and (c) have shown that these variations in perceived informativeness predict which conditions get focused as abnormal and, hence, dignified as the cause of the event. Where no abnormal condition is focused, no contrastive causal attribution is possible.
Variations in causal attribution as a function of the perceived normality of the conditions underlying the production of the target event can be naturally predicted from the abnormal conditions focus mode! but not from man-the-scientist models such as Kelley's (1967) ANOVA model or Jaspars et al.'s (1983) natural logic model, which both hypothesize the operation of contentindependent rules for causal attribution. It may be conjectured that the results obtained in the two experiments reported in the present study result from the interaction of configurational (here called presupposed norms) and covariational knowledge in Kelley's (1972) terms. Or it may be that an altogether different process to those proposed by the abnormal conditions focus model and the covariational models may be proposed, as in Jaspars's (1983) subjective scaling model. Whatever the theoretical and empirical merits of the abnormal conditions focus model as advanced in this article, subsequent research may be needed to settle these issues. Regardless of the outcome of such research, the abnormal conditions focus model nevertheless has the advantage of suggesting affinities between seemingly disparate areas of psychological enquiry.
At one level, the abnormal conditions focus model of causal attribution offers a view of causal ascription that corresponds to that developed in recent work on discourse analysis. Turnbull (1984) develops an analysis of causal explanation as being essentially contrastive in nature: An explanation is sought for when there is a gap between what is expected and what has occurred. Slugoski (1983) has demonstrated that speakers follow Gricean rules in only volunteering explanations that are informative from the listener's point of view, that is, that close a gap in the listener's knowledge.
Both Slugoski (1983) and Turnbull (in press) have noted that setting explanations in a conversational context offers a very different view of causal attribution to that advanced by the manthe-scientist analogy, where explanations are seen as essentially private enterprises divorced from social interaction. However, while the abnormal conditions focus model certainly allows that explanation may proceed as a private inquiry to resolve gaps between one's own expectations (in the form of presupposed norms) and what actually happened (in the form of the target), it is also able to account for the peculiarities of interpersonally deployed explanations by positing that the same principles of "information gain" (Jones & McGillis, 1976) govern the formulation of causal attributions for both personal and public consumption.
At a different level, the principle of information gain appears to be implicated in animal learning about covariational relations (Dickinson, 1980; Mackintosh, 1983) . Research has demonstrated that prior learning of a correlation between one signal and a target event blocks learning about the relation between a second signal and the target event, even if the two covary. It seems that a causal relation between two events may only be learned if the antecedent event enables the organism to predict a target event that is not already predicted by some other antecedent, that is, has signal value. Mere covariation alone does not lead to learning about the relation between two events; for the cause to be learned it must informative about the target event for the animal. An extension of this blocking paradigm (Kamin, 1969) to humans has shown a similar pattern of selective attribution (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984) . It would seem, therefore, that the principles of information gain employed by the abnormal conditions focus model may lie at the very heart of natural attribution processes.
